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ARGUMENT
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S RESPONSE ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES AND CASES GOVERNING
ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC RIGHTS REQUIRE FORMAL ACTION IN
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DO NOT
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN HIGHWAY EASEMENTS AND HIGHWAY RIGHTSOF-WAY IN FEE.
The Appellant seeks to differentiate this case from the many Utah cases holding
that abandonment of a highway requires an affirmative formal action by a public entity
with authority. Appellant argues that the law is different if the road is located upon a
right-of-way that is held in less than fee simple. This view is simply without any support
by either the statutes or the cases that have been decided for most of the past 100 years.
A. The statutory language.
Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (1943) provided "all highways once established must
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners
of the county in which they are situated, or other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-1-3 (1953) provided "All highways once established must continue to be highways
until abandoned by order of. . . competent authority." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102
(additional provisions enacted in 1963) provided "The commission shall act to abandon
any easement or to vacate any highway by resolution."; and Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105

1

(1999) "AH public highways once established shall continue until abandoned or
vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction . . .

." This has been

the rule in Utah since statehood with the exception of a period from about 1907 until
1911 when a period of five years of non-use was itself sufficient to constitute
abandonment1.
It is not possible to insert into this broad and clear language a separate rule for an
easement that is held in less than fee simple title. First, the language of the statute is plain
and clear: it expressly refers to all highways in a generic way without qualification as to
easements or title in fee. To differentiate between highways based on the nature of their
title would be a significant departure from the common meaning of the wording used in
these long standing statutes. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the standard
rules of construction set forth at Utah Code § 68-3-11(2001); OSI Indus.. Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah Ct App. 1993); and State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15, 245 P. 375, 57 A.L.R. 786 (1926) requiring that statutory words be interpreted in
accordance with their plain meaning.

x

This was the law in effect when the case Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P. 959, (Utah, 1912),
was decided. The repeal of this provision evidences a clear intent, perhaps in response to the
Tuttle decision, to change the law, and to no longer permit abandonment by non use.
2

The immediately preceding section in the same statutory chapter includes a section
providing that rights-of-way can be acquired by ten years public use.2 Such easements
established by adverse public use are not rights in fee, but only easements over the fee3.
It would be inconsistent for the statute to create rights-of-way by public use that are less
than fee, and not intend to include the same rights-of-way when in addressing the means
of their being abandoned or vacated.

Rather, the obvious construction is that the

requirements for abandonment of highway rights-of-way apply without distinction to
highways on fee and to those on less than fee. Appellant's argument does not have any
place within the applicable statutory language.
B. Utah case law.
There have been numerous cases decided by the Utah court applying the statutes
on abandonment of rights-of-way for public highways. The court has never created a
judicial exception to the statutory requirements, based on the right-of-way being held in
less than fee simple.
Appellant has tried to use the distinction concerning title to support their argument
that the law is different for this case. It is true that the nature of title to an easement may

2

Utah Code § 72-5-104; previously Utah Code § 27-12-89.

3

See for example Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
3

make a difference as to the effect of an abandonment of a highway. If a right-of-way not
held in fee is abandoned by proper statutory action, then the effect of the abandonment is
to revert title to the owner of the fee, whereas if the title is held in fee then the effect of
the abandonment does not give title to the abutting land owner. But this distinction as to
effect does not and never has been applied to modify the statutory requirement concerning
the means of abandonment. Abandonment in either event requires compliance with the
statute, and the statute requires formal action by the entity with jurisdiction. Appellant
cites cases in support of their argument, that do not apply: either the statute was not the
same at the time of the decision, the case did not involve a right-of-way for a public
highway, or the cases are from other jurisdictions. This is a question of statutory
interpretation of a Utah statute and out-of-state cases based on different statutes have no
application.
The only Utah case involving a highway right-of-way, Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P.
959, (Utah, 1912), was decided under a 1907 statute which for a brief 4 year period
permitted a determination of abandonment based on five years of non-use. Even in that
case, the issue was not the nature of the right-of-way but the evidence of non-use. The
language quoted by Appellant in support of their argument from Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent
Domain § 939, cites as its authority this early Utah case. The Am. Jur. statement quoted
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is directly contrary to the law as contained in all subsequent Utah statutes and in the
current Utah statute. The statutory language upon which the decision was based, was
changed shortly before the appellate decision in Turtle, supra and was apparently changed
to preclude abandonment by non-use.
Many of the cases cited by Appellee in support of its argument, are cases of roads
established by public use. For example see Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah
1974); and Western Kane County Special Service District No.l v. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). As has been noted these road rights-of-way are
not rights acquired in fee, but easements across the underlying fee; see Premium Oil Co.,
supra. The court has applied the statute with equal force to such rights-of-way. If there
were to be a distinction between roads acquired in fee and roads acquired by easement, it
would be expected to arise in the context of such easements created by operation of law
since it would be reasonable that the rights of an underlying fee owner would be
considered greater when an easement is acquired by such acts of public use, rather than by
purchase and express grant of an easement from the owner. However, these cases have
uniformly upheld the application of the statute to such easements. If the rule applies
equally to such easements created by implication, it should certainly apply to easements
created by deed where consideration was paid.

5

The public policy for such uniform application of the statute is based in part on
the judicially recognized need for a public process when disposing of public rights.
Courts have recognized the wisdom of requiring affirmative and formal acts of a public
official when eliminating a public right, to such an extent

as to preclude adverse

possession of public land; see Averett v. Utah County Drainage Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Such a rule is preferable to one permitting loss of a public right
due to the vagaries of time and memory, the ambiguities of public and private actions, and
the potential for abuse or fraud. The safer rule is to require evidence that an agency with
jurisdiction has taken the required affirmative action before finding a public right-of-way
to be terminated. This policy should not be less, if the highway right-of-way is held by
an easement rather than fee. The same reasoning applies. As was stated in the decision of
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1, supra (a road established by public
use was not used and another route was used instead, for more than 50 years) it is
necessary that the "strict statutory procedure be followed for the vacation of a public
road." Id. at 1378.
Olsen v. Board of Education.571 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1977) is the only other Utah
case cited by Appellants as authority for the distinction involving title. This was not a
highway case and consequently the statute at issue in this case is not applicable and the

6

decision does not provide authority. The case involved the interpretation of a deed with a
conditions subsequent, not rights-of-way used by the public for highway purposes..

2.
APPELLANT MISREPRESENTS THE FACTS IN SUPPORT OF
THE ALLEGED ABANDONMENT, AND THIS FACTUAL DISPUTE
ILLUSTRATES AND SUPPORTS THE NEED FOR STRICT ENFORCEMENT
OF THE STATUTORY RULE REQUIRING FORMAL ACTION BY THE
AGENCY.

Appellant asserts inter alia that the land within the 1936 Right-of-way was fenced
after 1951, that the land was not used as a highway after 1951, and that the land was reacquired in the 1951 condemnation and in a later 1967 condemnation. (Appellant's Reply
Brief at 17.) Each of these allegations are misleading or false. The actual facts show that
the 1951 fence was located along a line equal distant from the highway surface consistent
with the limited access nature of the highway, which line did not correspond with the
centerline nor with either boundary of the allegedly abandoned 1936 right-of-way.(R at
252 and 258.) In the 1951 condemnation the reason for retaining the land and acquiring
additional land at the corner of Old Mountain Road and the new highway alignment was
challenged. UDOT's engineer testified that the highway purposes for the acquisition (and
by implication the reason for retention of the adjacent right-of-way) was to preserve it for
future highway expansion, to preclude development requiring dangerous access near the
7

intersection, and to prevent short-cutting across the property in order to protect public
safety. (R at 378 to 384.) The language of the deed is that the land was to be used for
"highway purposes" not as a highway. Finally, the subsequent condemnations did not
acquire the land already within the right-of-way, but explicitly and carefully excluded the
land in the 1936 deed when calculating the amount to be paid (see the right-of-way
contacts R at 145 and 152, Appellee's Brief at 10 f.n. 4 and 5.) As previously argued in
the Appellee's Brief on cross appeal, the exclusion of the land in the existing right-of-way
demonstrates that the land was not considered abandoned.
This recitation of the disputed facts in this case demonstrates the reason for the
statutory requirement for a formal act of abandonment by an entity with jurisdiction. It
illustrates the endless number of circumstances where the State would continually be
defending itself against such claims. The evidence was undisputed that there had
never been a deed or other action by UDOT abandoning the right-of-way. (R. at
268). There was never even such a claim. Strict adherence to the statutory requirement
that there be such a deed or action, will avoid innumerable disputes relying on long-cold
memories, on disputed interpretation of events, or willful misrepresentation. The statute
was intended to protect the public investment in the state's highway rights-of-way. Such
a purpose is sound, clear, and should be followed.

8

CONCLUSION
The testimony of the witnesses was undisputed that the 1936 Right-of-Way has not
been vacated or abandoned in accordance with Utah Code §72-5-105 (1999) and its
predecessors.

The court erred in considering the possible evidence of actions of

abandonment.

The requirement for formal action should not ignored, and a judicial

exception should not be created.

Since the right-of-way that was acquired in 1936 has

not been abandoned as required by statute, UDOT should not need to re-acquire it in this
action.
Respectfully submitted this f^?3ay of January, 2002
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

- ^ U : ? CUM)*,
STEVEN F. ALDER
Assistant Attorney General
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APPELLEE was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this l\Cr aay of January 2002, to the
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STEVEN F. ALDER
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